[1] Film has traditionally been a good business and a bad investment. The dream machine has been oiled by sources as varied as property developers, tax-averse Germans and the Baptist church. But returns have usually been disappointing. The inherent riskiness of the film business is one reason; another is the studios' accounting practices, which, until recently, were as laden with special effects as the films they produced。

　　[2] The need for serious money has changed all that. The big studios now spend an average of just over $100m making and selling each film. Led by Disney, they are cutting back on the number of movies they produce, making the gambles they do take all the more risky. The studios' corporate parents would prefer it if their financial reports were a little less suspenseful. Hence the new, more open and honest attitude to private investors。

　　[3] For the past few years the big studios have encouraged hedge funds and other investors to back “candidates” of several dozen films spread over more than a year. Although the financiers are not allowed to get their hands on reliable money-makers such as “Harry Potter” or “Spider-Man”， they still find the candidates less risky, and hence more appealing, than individual films. Last September Merrill Lynch estimated that outsiders cover more than 30% of the cost of film production。

　　[4] One result is that Wall Street now knows much more about how the film business works. As their experience grows, some investors are beginning to think they can “beat the house”， as John Burke, a Hollywood dealmaker, puts it. Rather than backing every film put out by a studio, they are investing in producers with good records. Michael London, who specialises in making family dramas, and Joel Silver, who is notably good at blowing things up, are among the recent recipients of such largesse. Several more such deals are rumored and the pace may increase if JPMorgan goes ahead with its plan to set up a film-finance arm。

　　[5] This has changed the arc of Hollywood careers. Not so long ago, producers and film stars who fell out with studio bosses might retire to write books with titles like “You'll Never Eat Lunch in This Town Again”. These days they round up some private equity and get back to work. Thanks to Goldman Sachs, Bob and Harvey Weinstein were able to set up a new film studio just two months after they angrily left Disney in 2005。

　　[6] Although the big names get most of the attention, Wall Street money is churning the independent film business, too. Until recently, investors were nervous about dealing with firms that produce only a few films a year. But financiers have noticed that cheap hits such as “Little Miss Sunshine” can be hugely profitable. And beneath their varied exteriors, such outfits are reassuringly obsessed with cost control. Jim Stern, a former fund manager who has raised enough money to start producing films, reckons he can undercut the big studios by making them for $20m--35m。

　　[7] Such a minnow tries to protect its investors by pre-selling films abroad and exploiting tax rebates offered by other states to filmmakers who shoot outside California. Overture Films, a four-month-old studio, plans to follow a similar strategy. It will eschew broad teenage fare (which is expensive to advertise) in favor of movies targeted at narrower audiences such as blacks and young women。

　　[8] Chris McGurk, who runs Overture, reckons that three-quarters of the newly financed outfits will be gone within five years, and he may be right. The film industry's real problem, says John Sloss, a consultant, is not so much a shortage of films as a shortage of eyeballs. Getting movies to the screen and the DVD racks, and persuading people to see them, is the tricky part. Here the established studios have a huge advantage. They have global networks and legions of marketing men—and can attach their trailers to blockbusters。

　　[9] The other problem is that film is such an unpredictable business. Who could have predicted, for example, that Americans would spend some $70m in just three days last week to see “300”， a poorly reviewed film featuring a Scottish-accented Spartan warrior? Perhaps nobody—but a studio like Warner, which produced the film, probably had a better chance than a hedge-fund manager trying to beat the odds. New money is transforming Hollywood, but institutional memory will always count for something. 

　　Film as a bad investment (Paras. 1--3) is noted to suggest that

　　the studios’ accounting practices are likened to special effects。

　　the big studios cannot overcome disadvantages of their own。

　　people still take the new and more open attitude to investors。

　　the investors may largely influence the prospect of film firms。

　　In the author’s view, potential film-finance (Paras. 4--5) may result in

　　A.  the better working conditions of film businesses。

　　B.  some investors’ reconsideration of their plans。

　　C.  the career changes of producers and film stars。

　　D.  more and more new film studios in Hollywood。

　　From Paragraph 6, we can infer the film investors’ conception of

　　cost-effectiveness。

　　no nervousness。

　　huge profits。

　　cost control。

　　Like Overture Film (Paras. 7--8) , the small studios are inferior to the established studios in having

　　no similar strategy。

　　less audiences。

　　no global network。

　　a shortage of films。

　　The last paragraph is mainly concerned with

　　A.  the unpredictability in film making。

　　B.  the better chance to beat the odds。

　　C.  the transformation oiled by new money。

　　D.  the importance of institutional memory。

　　1从传统上讲，电影是一项不错的事业，但不是最佳投资。使这台梦机器顺利运转的投资者像房地产商一样形形色色，有厌恶税费的德国人和浸会教堂。但是，回报通常是令人失望的。一是因为电影业存在潜在风险；另一个原因是电影公司以前的会计实务有很多特技，就像他们制作的电影一样。

　　2对严肃投资资金的需求改变了所有这一切。大的电影公司现在平均花一亿多美元制作和营销每部电影。在迪斯尼的领导下，他们减少了电影制作量，赌注的风险就更大了。电影公司的母公司希望财务报告少让人担心些。因此，对待私人投资者就会有新的、更加开放和诚实的态度。

　　3在过去的几年中，大的电影公司鼓励对冲基金和另外一些投资者对分散在一年多内拍摄的几十部影片的“候选制片人”进行投资。虽然金融家不能插手象《哈里 波特》或《蜘蛛人》那样的肯定能赚钱的影片，但他们还是发现对制片人投资风险更少，因此，比投资私人电影更加吸引人。去年九月，估计30%多的电影制作成本来自外部资金。

　　4结果是华尔街现在对电影业的运作有更多的了解。好莱坞的风险投资人约翰·伯克说，随着他们对经验的积累，一些投资者开始认为他们可以“赢庄家”。他们对以往成绩优秀的电影制片人进行投资，而不资助电影公司拍摄的每部电影。专长于拍摄家庭剧的麦克·伦敦和明显擅长于拍摄爆炸场景的乔·西尔沃就是最近接受如此慷慨援助的人。据谣传，还有几个更多的类似交易，而且如果摩根大通银行想设立电影资助部门的计划照常进行的话，步伐可能加快。

　　5这改变了好莱坞的职业轨迹。以前，与电影公司老板闹翻的制片人和影星也许退休后写书，题目是“你将永远不在这个城镇吃中饭”。如今，他们聚积了一些私人资产，又回来工作了。

　　多亏了高盛公司，鲍泊和哈维·温斯丁能够在2005年气愤地离开迪斯尼两个月后就建立一个新的电影公司。

　　6虽然大人物获得的注意力最多，但是华尔街资金也剧烈地搅动了整个独立电影业。直到最近，投资商都对一年只拍几部电影的公司感到紧张。但是金融家们已经注意到像《阳光小美女》这样低成本制作的流行影片可以赚大钱。虽然他们的外表标新立异，这类公司无疑满脑子想的都是成本控制。杰姆·斯登以前是财务经理，筹集了足够的资金来拍摄电影。他认为他能够与大的电影公司砍价，把钱压到两千万至三千五百万之间。

　　7如此不起眼的公司设法通过在国外预先营销影片和利用其它国家对在加州以外拍摄的制片人提供的出口退税来保护投资者。四个月前才成立的“序曲影业公司”计划采用相同的策略。它将避免广泛的青少年节目(做广告非常昂贵)，而喜欢针对更窄一些的像黑人和年轻妇女一样的观众。

　　8序曲影业公司老板克里斯• 麦克歌克估计，接受资助的新影业公司中有三分之一将会在五年内消失。也许他是对的。影业顾问约翰•斯劳斯说，电影工业的真正问题不是缺少电影，而是缺少眼球。上映电影和让电影上DVD架并规劝人们去看电影是很棘手的一关。地位稳固的电影公司在这方面有巨大的优势。他们有环球网络和市场营销兵团，并能把电影预告片与大片绑在一起。

　　9另外一个问题是，电影是不可预测的行业。比如，谁能预测到上周美国人会在三天内花费七千万美元看《300》呢？这部影片是关于一位操苏格兰口音的斯巴达克战士的故事，影评反映很差。也许，除了拍摄这部电影的华纳电影公司之外，没有人能战胜厄运，只有对冲基金经理才有机会这样做。新的投资资金在改变好莱坞，但是，机构记忆将永远是重要的。

　　21. 答案为[D]。此题属多段落推理题，以第二段的话题句(topic)为“点”，综合考核几个段落这个“面”(zone)，所以需要推导深层的含义；这一考研英语的命题强势，值得特别关注。(D)为答案，源于第三段尾句和第四段内容。作者的观点为：要对个人投资者坦诚相见，鼓励他们给有业绩的电影公司投资等等。由此可见，投资者对电影公司前程的重要影响。

　　22. 答案为[C]。此题可视为因果关系归纳题。第六段的主题句及其下文的说明，均可以判断(C)为题干的结果，所以是正确答案。而从第六段结尾和第七段看，我们不能得出结果“好莱坞会有越来越多的电影公司”，所以(D)被排出掉了。

　　答案为[A]。此题应为段落推理题。从第八段能够推断出这样的含义：投资商(Wall Street money, investors, financiers)的所作所为都是建立在“低成本高利润”(cost-effective)的观念之上的，所以(A)为答案，其它三个选项均以偏代全，故不选。

　　答案为[B]。此题可为段落语义归纳题。我们有时要能够识别“正话反说”的命题方式。第九段说明小公司“targeted at narrower audiences”， 而且第十段也指出大公司“have a huge advantage”。由此题干反过来命题：小公司不如大公司的地方是(B)“有较少的观众”，所以(B)是答案。

　　25。答案为[D]。此题属于全文主旨题。命题时经常把最后一段作为结论段，设制能够表达作者全文思想的主旨题。当我们看到“句①….but句②…。”这样的并列结构的时候，应该意识到语义重心在but之后的语句②上。所以，这里(C)不是答案，而(D)才是结论段中作者的意图所指。