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孟涓涓
系别:应用经济学系
职称:讲师
办公电话:000-00000000
Email:jumeng@gsm.pku.edu.cn
教授简介
孟涓涓,现任北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系和金融系助理教授,她在美国加州大学获得经济学博士学位。
孟博士目前的研究专长包括行为经济学,行为金融学,劳动经济学,发展经济学等。她的研究成果发表在国外顶级学术期刊上,如American Economic Review.她目前主持国家自然科学基金青年基金研究项目 “个体经济行为中的社会性因素”。孟博士曾获奖项有:2007-2008Excellence in Referee Rewards, The American Economics Review,2001-2004北大明德奖学金。
孟博士现在北京大学光华管理学院教授管理经济学和高级微观经济学等课程。
研究领域
行为经济学
行为金融学
劳动经济学
发展经济学
教育背景
2010 加州大学圣迭戈分校 经济学 博士
2005 北京大学 金融学 学士
职业经历
2010~至今
北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系、金融系助理教授
研究成果
Publications:
With Vincent P. Crawford, “New York City Cabdrivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Utility with Targets for Hours and Income”, American Economic Review 101 (August 2011), 1912-1932
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1851878
Abstract: This paper proposes a model of cabdrivers’ labor supply, building on Henry S. Farber’s (2005, 2008) empirical analyses and BotondK?szegi and Matthew Rabin’s (2006; henceforth “KR”) theory or reference-dependent preferences. Following KR, our model has targets for hours as well as income, both determined by rational expectations. Estimated with Farber’s data, our model reconciles his finding that stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with Colin Camerer et al.’s (1997) negative wage elasticity of hours; and avoids his criticism that estimates of drivers’ income targets are too unstable to yield a useful model of labor supply.
Working Papers:
“The Disposition Effect and Expectations as Reference Point.” revise and resubmit to Journal of Finance
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1851883 (October, 2011 update)
Abstract: The disposition effect refers to the tendency for investors to sell winning stocks too early and hold losing stocks for too long. This paper shows that investors’ psychological aversion to losses relative to a reference point predicts the disposition effect when the reference point is defined by expected wealth but not the status quo wealth. Estimates from individual trading records suggest that investors’ reference level of gains is higher than risk-free rate, and it is closely tied to their past average realized gains. Infrequent traders are also shown to have higher reference level and stronger disposition effect than frequent traders. Expectations as reference point provide a simple explanation to these regularities. This theory also has the potential to link expectations to the magnitude of the disposition effect hence market movement.
With Wanchuan Lin and Yiming Liu, "Will Formal Risk Sharing Arrangements Crowd Out Informal Mechanisms: An Experimental Study" 2011
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1937514
Abstract: An important issue with promoting formal insurance in the rural areas of developing countries is the interaction between formal insurance and preexisting informal risk sharing arrangements. Will the introduction of formal insurance crowd out private transfer? What are the welfare consequences? This paper presents the first laboratory study investigating these issues. We show that the introduction of formal insurance crowds out informal risk sharing arrangements. This effect is strengthened by ex-ante income inequality and weakened by path dependence of the existing informal mechanisms. We further show that the introduction of formal insurance provides better risk coverage when income is equal, but when ex-ante inequality exists, there is no significant risk reduction due to the large crowding-out effect.
"Social Distance, Interpersonal Interaction and Impersonal Exchange", 2010
Abstract: Personal relationships and anonymous market have been previously modeled in ways that prevent them from coexisting in equilibrium as contract enforcement mechanisms. Empirical evidence nonetheless suggests that they sometimes coexist. This paper introduces social utility into preferences, which is determined by social distance and specific to personal relationships but not to impersonal anonymous market exchange. This preference-based approach allows the two modes of exchange to coexist in equilibrium and further characterizes how their market shares depend on the degree of social heterogeneity. The possibility of impersonal exchange improves welfare and equality among buyers in general. But there also exist cases where competition between the two forms of exchange makes welfare and equality deteriorate.
Research in Progress:
"Social Distance and the Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing"
"Social Learning or Social Conformity? The Case of Stock Market Participation Decision"
教授课程
1. 管理经济学
2. 高级微观经济学
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